Eastern European science stuck in an outmoded system
SIR -The problem that Jan Konvalinka and colleagues identify in their Correspondence -that the Czech bibliometric system for assessing grant proposals encourages mediocre research (Nature 460, 1079; 2009) -is widespread in eastern Europe. Some policymakers are upholding the old systems for allocating funds in public universities and research institutes, rather than using them to promote the best science.
In Slovenia, a bibliometric system introduced a few years ago provides the main criteria for awarding research grants by national government, often overriding peer-reviewed evaluation. It divides scientific journals into categories that disregard impact factors, on the grounds that journals vary in quality for different fields. Although there may be some justification for the thinking behind this, the system in practice favours researchers who publish in low-impact journals over those who are struggling to do internationally competitive science and to publish in the best journals.
For example, a Slovenian endocrinologist might choose to publish a basic animal study in a prestigious endocrinology journal or in a much lower-impact agricultural journal. If the latter journal is rated at a higher position among agricultural journals than the former is in the field of endocrinology, the researcher will receive more points for publishing in the low-impact agricultural journal.
Likewise, a review article in a journal with no impact factor (but included in SCI, the science citation index) could be worth as many as 20 Slovenian bibliometric points, whereas one paper that was recently published in Nature -the result of years of work -gained its authors just 18.75 points each.
With the exception of the former East Germany, many universities and science policies First, the quality-of-life evaluation mentioned in your News Feature (Nature 461, 336-339; 2009) needs more thought. NICE would achieve more if it valued health interventions according to the real suffering of patients, rather than on the basis of the hypothetical preferences of the public. There is evidence showing that the public are often prepared to sacrifice more life years than patients might be.
Also, public and patient preferences can misrepresent the impact of a particular state of health on our experiences (P. Dolan and D. Kahneman Econ. J. 118, 215-234; 2008) . For example, we may imagine physical pain to be more severe than depression, but depression can make us feel worse and so we evaluate our lives less favourably.
Second, NICE should not raise the cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) threshold for some conditions, such as the end of life, until there is good evidence for doing so. The threshold varies across different conditions. From an implicit default position where all QALYs are treated equally, NICE can now give greater weight to QALYs at the later stages of a terminal disease. NICE justifies this position as being in accordance with the views of the general public -yet the evidence in this regard is actually quite weak.
There is some support from NICE's Citizens' Council for spending more on end-of-life care, but this preference has not been elicited in the context of what people would give up for it. In a choice between prioritizing end of life and reducing inequalities in lifetime health, it is likely that the general public would choose the latter (see go.nature.com/ QgnrFX). 
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